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helped enact legislation that has made it possible for the appropriation of \$126,478,000 to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and \$82,005,000 to the Public Health Service Division of Indian Health—almost a quarter of a billion dollars for the present fiscal year. Compare this with less than \$1.25 billion for the entire period from 1900 to 1950.

By experience and knowledge as an enrolled member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, as one born in an Indian reservation cabin of a fullblood Indian mother who spoke only her native tongue, as a boy who grew up speaking the Sioux language and living in an Indian community until he was 19, as a youth who went 400 miles way from home to go to high school back in 1925, as an adult who worked in the Bureau of Indian Affairs from 1933 until running for Congress in 1960, I must say that the President's message portrays a true picture of the situation as it presently exists.

It is sincerely hoped that the President's recommendations will be carefully considered and favorably acted upon not only by this and succeeding Congresses but also by the respective departments and agencies of Government mentioned in the message.

Mr. OLSEN. Mr. Speaker, President Johnson today focused the Nation's concern on one of America's most neglected minorities—the Indian population.

I commend the President for his determination to turn long years of indifference into a new plan for progress to bring jobs, housing, and better health to the Indian people.

For all too long the Nation has regarded the Indians as its wards in a dependent status. Now, President Johnson proposes that the American Indian take the rightful place as a full participant in the mainstream of American life.

The President is not recommending half measures; he is proposing an across-the-board program that will deal effectively with the most pressing needs of the Indians—for more and better jobs; improved education and health; adequate housing and a new role for the Indian in community life.

Congress must stand firmly with the President. These programs are well within our means to afford.

We cannot continue to deny Americans who are Indians their rights in American life.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. Speaker, the President has sent to the Congress today a message on the American Indian entitled "The Forgotten American." This is an appropriate title illustrating the present condition of the American Indian and expressing the resolve of a nation that his condition be improved.

As a member of the House Indian Affairs Subcommittee, I look forward to participating in the formulation and evaluation of programs to help the American Indian and will work toward the implementation of the goals set out in the President's message, as follows:

A standard of living for the Indians equal to that of the country as a whole.

Freedom of Choice: An opportunity to remain in their homelands, if they choose, without surrendering their dignity; an opportunity

to move to the towns and cities of America, if they choose, equipped with the skills to live in equality and dignity.

Full participation in the life of modern America, with a full share of economic opportunity and social justice.

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Speaker, I want to echo, most emphatically, the words of President Johnson in his special message on Indians:

We can only fulfill our responsibility to the first Americans by helping them fulfill their own destiny as Americans among us.

For far too long our Federal programs for Indians failed to recognize the wants and desires of the Indians themselves, and sought instead to impose on them the will of the dominant non-Indian society.

Now, thank goodness, we have a President who is willing to point to our past failures, outline recent progress, and chart a course for the future designed to give Indians a maximum of free choice as to how they enter modern-day American life on terms of equality with other citizens.

It is also significant, to me as a member of the House Interior Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, that the plight of our Indians is forcefully called to the Nation's attention at a time when public gaze is centered on the status of minorities as it has not been in decades, if ever before.

Emphasis on Indian participation in planning and implementing programs is welcomed, I am sure, because this is a means by which Indian leadership can be developed at higher levels. The basic ingredients for preparing Indian youth are also stressed—education and training. And there is new emphasis on adult education and vocational training for adult Indians who have thus far been bypassed in our national progress.

The call for clear new national goals for Government policy toward Indians should be heeded and the machinery and funds necessary to accomplish the desired results should be provided.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, President Johnson's message on the plight of the Nation's Indian population has touched the conscience of us all.

We—all of us—have neglected the problems of these proud people for far too long. I join with the President in the hope that the time has come to reverse this situation—and tackle head on the illiteracy, poverty, and lack of opportunity that all too many American Indians are forced to endure.

We can turn the clock ahead for the Indian population by opening up new opportunity and help to improve their lives and their future prospects.

As the President said, the Nation's goal must be to help make the Indians self-sufficient. We seek not to impose social or cultural changes upon them, but to offer the kind of help that will allow them to live by their own lights, in security and in dignity.

I commend the President for this important and timely message. I believe my colleagues will join with me in expressing the belief that Congress will act promptly to help a group that the President has rightly called, "the Forgotten American."

PRESIDENT JOHNSON OFFERS A MESSAGE OF HOPE AND COMPASSION TO HELP THE AMERICAN INDIAN

(Mr. ADAMS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend President Johnson for his excellent message today on the American Indian.

This message reflects Lyndon Johnson's deep and compassionate concern for those Americans who are outside of the mainstream of our national life.

Certainly, this is the most inclusive message ever presented to the Congress to provide better health, housing, and job opportunities to the Indian population.

As the President noted today:

For two centuries, the Indian has been an alien in his own land.

We can—and must—end the discrimination, indifference, and neglect that has perpetuated the Indians' status as second-class citizens.

There can be no legitimate reason for Congress to delay in promptly enacting this fair and progressive legislation.

Let us join with President Johnson in providing a new era of hope and progress for the American Indian.

PERMISSION FOR SUBCOMMITTEE ON GENERAL EDUCATION, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, TO SIT TODAY

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on General Education of the Committee on Education and Labor be permitted to sit this afternoon for the purpose of taking testimony.

Mr. Speaker, this has been cleared with the minority and they have no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALBERT). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 14940, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT AMENDMENTS, 1968

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up the resolution (H. Res. 1082) providing for consideration of H.R. 14940 to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization for appropriations, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 1082

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14940) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization for appropriations. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed one hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking

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minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. LATTI] and, pending that, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 1082 provides an open rule with 1 hour of general debate for consideration of H.R. 14940 to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization for appropriations.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which began operations in 1961, is an independent agency which provides recommendations and advice to the executive branch on matters relating to arms control and disarmament. It provides essential scientific, military, psychological, and technological information to representatives of the United States in the conduct of negotiations with other nations dealing with arms control and disarmament.

H.R. 14940 authorizes an appropriation of \$33 million to finance the operation of the Agency for a 3-year period. The Agency has programed \$10 million for fiscal year 1969, \$12 million for fiscal year 1970, and \$11 million for fiscal year 1971.

The previous authorization in 1965 was \$30 million for the 3 fiscal years 1966, 1967, and 1968. All previous authorizations for the Agency have been for more than 1 year.

Except for the authorization of funds, the bill makes no change in the existing authority of the Agency.

Mr. Speaker, at a time when our own soldiers are engaged in mortal combat in Vietnam, consideration of a measure such as this may seem incongruous; but adoption of this resolution will strongly indicate to the world that even while engaged in warfare, this country is determined to continue its endeavors in arms control and disarmament, in its constant and overriding search for world peace.

Mr. LATTI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized.

(Mr. LATTI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LATTI. Mr. Speaker, I agree with the statements just made by my colleague from Hawaii. The resolution does provide for an open rule with 1 hour of debate and little opposition to the rule has been noted. But in looking at the supplemental views and studying them thoroughly, I point out that even though there was little opposition to granting a rule there is some question about the bill itself.

One of them is the desirability of approving this authorization for 3 years. As the supplemental views point out, I

believe that this Congress and succeeding Congresses should have a look, and a hard look, at this Agency, its operations, and its accomplishments.

Previously we have approved 3-year authorizations for this Agency. During these 3-year intervals, questions have been raised as to the accomplishments of the Agency and also concerning some of its research projects. For example, the last paragraph of page 7 of the Supplemental Views reads as follows:

Three years ago, when the Agency last appeared to request an authorization, many members of the committee were disturbed about some of the external research projects funded by the Agency.

I hasten to point out that more than one-half of the requested authorization is to be used for these research projects, not for the operation of the Agency itself. Continuing now with the examples from the supplemental views:

We mention only a few: a study of peace-keeping operations in the Congo (\$100,404); a still uncompleted study of the fiscal and financial systems in Eastern Europe (\$196,200 to date); and a study of the social and psychological aspects of verification, inspection, and international assurance (\$83,500). During the next 3 years the Agency notes that "trial arms control measures appropriate to the Chinese cultural and historical background will be analyzed in the light of the data developed."

It seems to me that with these types of projects being paid for by taxpayers' funds, this Congress ought to have a look at this matter more often than every 3 years. Certainly every Congress ought to have an opportunity to take a good hard look at what this Agency is researching and the good to be derived from them.

The question also arose whether or not some of these research projects are not duplication of projects being carried on by other departments of the Government. For example, by the Atomic Energy Commission.

It was pointed out before the Rules Committee that one of the accomplishments of this Agency was the establishment of the hotline. It seems to me I recall the administration, particularly the White House, had a considerable amount to do with the establishment of this hotline. The question in my mind is whether or not this Agency or the White House should have the credit for this so-called achievement.

Hence, there are several questions to be debated here today when we begin to debate the bill.

I yield to the gentleman from Illinois 5 minutes.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

I realize that it is perhaps a bit unusual for a member of the committee which deals with the legislation also to take time under the rule. I do so because I think it is important for this body to recognize the unusual opportunity that is presently before us. This is my eighth year as a Member of this body, and I cannot recall a circumstance anywhere near similar to the one now presented; that is, an opportunity for this body to have a direct impact upon a treaty under active consideration.

It is taken for granted by most people that treaties are the province of the executive branch in consultation with the Senate only, and the House has no effective role which it can assert. Through pure coincidence, the extension of the authority for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency comes at the very time that the draft treaty negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union is now under consideration. Here is our chance to use the "power of the purse" effectively, and it pains me a little bit to recognize the rather scant interest that is evinced so far in this measure.

The hearings are printed, they are available, they are not too lengthy for examination even this afternoon. The committee report contains not only a summary of the legislation by the majority of the committee and many on the minority side, but it also contains some dissenting views, which I think should be read and taken into account by other Members of this body.

It also contains—what is even more important—the text of the draft treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. I wonder how many Members of this body have actually read the draft treaty word for word? To me it is one of the most far-reaching treaties in its potential adverse impact upon our national security that has been considered by our Government in many, many years. Here we have the opportunity before us today to deal with the text of that treaty, because it is indeed the only real substantial product of this agency since this authorization for the agency was extended 3 years ago.

Last year I had a conversation with a leading Member of the British Parliament. He told me he had been a keen student of American history, and he had noticed that in this century the Senate had become—at least in the headlines of Europe—the predominant body of the Congress, and he wondered why that was so. He said a century ago it was the other way around. The House was the real foreign policy influence in treaty affairs as well as other realms of the Government. In my view, the change—insofar as it has occurred—is due to the reluctance of the House to exercise the power of the purse.

Here today we have before us an authorization for an agency whose product is a treaty now under consideration. During the course of the debate by the Committee of the Whole, I hope to have the opportunity to offer an amendment which will reinstate a condition that three Presidents had insisted upon in all arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union. This condition was—as has been described most commonly—the NATO option. President Eisenhower first set forth this condition when there was first discussed through the Disarmament Conference some kind of an agreement to cut back on nuclear weapons and also to limit the proliferation of these weapons. Very wisely President Eisenhower insisted that no agreement could be considered which would foreclose the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the NATO alliance, at some future date, if its members saw fit to do so, to develop and own

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and operate its own nuclear defense system.

Today this sort of system becomes more practical with the refinement of weapons which can be indeed purely defensive in character. This NATO option policy was insisted upon in all negotiations carried on under the Eisenhower administration. It was also consistently maintained under the administration of President Kennedy, and by President Johnson until the fall of 1966.

I cannot cite any development which occurred in that period which would justify our Government at that late date, after all these years of consideration, disregarding or throwing away this important position which had been so consistently maintained by three administrations.

The first inkling of the change in heart on the part of our Government came in President Johnson's celebrated speech of October 1966 on European policy. This was his famous "bridge-building" speech, in which he called for new bridges to the Soviet Union and to the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. One of the items in that speech was a statement in which the President said that our Government would work actively to work out an agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

We must accept the fact that the NATO option was dropped by President Johnson as a part of the "bridge-building" package.

Now, 1966 was a lot different from 1968. We have on all sides evidence of increased Soviet participation in the war in Vietnam. As the gentleman from Hawaii said so appropriately, it is incongruous that the United States should make what is essentially a bilateral deal with the Soviet Union at the very same time the Soviet Union is fighting with such effect, although by proxy, against us in the war in Vietnam.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. HOSMER].

(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, I oppose the legislation to extend the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's authorization for appropriations because I believe its structure and attitude needs overhauling before it is permitted to handle any more public funds.

ACDA'S FAILURE TO EVALUATE ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

The purpose of any arms control or disarmament treaty is to enhance national security; that is, the Nation should be safer after the treaty than before. It is ACDA's responsibility to make such analyses of proposed treaties. Without any such analysis of the Nonproliferation Treaty, ACDA simply adopted "a NPT is good for you" attitude and proceeded to negotiate. I personally asked both ACDA's Chief and its Deputy Chief to make such a study. They have not done so. There are a number of interesting alternatives to nonproliferation. Selective defensive proliferation, which I will discuss later, is one of them. In an ever changing and dangerous world to

place such alternatives beyond the Nation's reach by the stroke of a treaty pen without even analyzing them is reckless irresponsibility. Yet the NPT would do that and was negotiated by ACDA without ever analyzing and evaluating alternatives. ACDA totally ignored the procedures by which vital national security decisions have been made for almost a decade. That is, by the computer aided formulas of "systems analysis" which Secretary McNamara contends provides us the most cost-effective Defense Establishment known to man.

The key feature of this decisionmaking tool is an examination of every conceivable alternative national security option to determine that most effective in relation to cost, while at the same time reserving the maximum possible open options for switches as the problem changes or becomes better defined. ACDA's NPT forecloses all alternatives to nonproliferation, no matter how critical to national security they might become. Will this make the Nation "safer" than it is without the NPT? ACDA will give you a lot of opinion to the affirmative. But ACDA cannot give you an analysis. It has not done its homework. It has failed in its job and shirked its responsibility. It should not be given any more money.

ACDA'S STRUCTURAL DEFECT

I also oppose extending ACDA's authorization for appropriations because of a fundamental defect in its charter which foredooms it to such failures. I reiterate that the principal purpose of an agency of this sort is analysis to determine whether various arms control and disarmament proposals will enhance or detract from the Nation's security and to discover the pitfalls and to find the means to avoid the quicksands. We rely upon ACDA to do this. It should be able to execute this responsibility as independently as the GAO executes its responsibility. Yet we permit and encourage ACDA to engage in actual negotiations where its people must take bargaining stands and make quick responses to the thrusts of other countries' negotiators. What ACDA's people do in haste under these circumstances may be good or bad, right or wrong. And if it is bad and wrong, ACDA's researchers and analysts nevertheless are stuck with it. Instead of being free to evaluate in terms of national interests, they must evaluate in terms of backing up ACDA's negotiators. My strong recommendation is that ACDA be taken out of the negotiating arena to prevent the Agency's principal purpose of giving good sound advice from being subordinated to its collateral negotiating responsibilities which are functions of the State Department anyway.

ACDA'S UNBALANCED RESEARCH PROGRAMS

ACDA should be reformed in another respect before it gets any more money. But rather than reform, it purposes to make matters worse. Mr. Foster says he is planning to contract less research out and beef up the Agency's own internal research staff. This, of course, amounts to no more than an exercise in intellectual incest. ACDA is not about to hire any independent-minded researchers who

will tell it when it is heading down a wrong road. That is a characteristic of bureaucracy that needs no elaboration. From what I have been able to observe, watching ACDA as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and a congressional adviser to our delegation to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, ACDA does not even do a good job in contracting out research. I do not have specifics, but I do have the opinion that ACDA does little contract research with any organizations it suspects might come up with anything contrary to its preconceived notions. At least I know personally that it has been heedless of my suggestions as an ENDC adviser.

ACDA'S HOSTILITY TO TREATY ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

Further, I have no enthusiasm for ACDA getting any more money while it adheres to its beliefs that treaties really do not need machinery to compel compliance and that you can trust the Communists to live up to their treaty promises. In 1959 former President Eisenhower wisely warned Congress:

We can have no confidence in any treaty to which the communists are a party, except where such treaty provides within itself for self-enforcing mechanisms . . .

The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1964 recognized this principle, at least in a negative way, because underground testing was exempted from its bans when no mechanism could be devised to police cheating in the underground environment. This occurred at a time before the military was completely muzzled and the Joint Chiefs used what vocal freedom they then had to alert the American public to the dangers posed by surreptitious nuclear testing underground. Since that time Pentagon regulations have made it difficult even for Congress to learn any independent views of military officers. And the current war's "no heroes" policy has barred the emergence of a Nimitz, Eisenhower, Patton, Burke, MacArthur, and so forth, capable of communicating with the public. So far in limbo has the uniformed military gone that I doubt if even most Congressmen can give you the names of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Under these circumstances ACDA seems to have seized an opportunity to whittle away at the self-enforcing mechanisms principle and promote a treaty for treaty's sake philosophy. It came up with studies calculated to prove that positive detection of treaty cheating is not really necessary. As I read ACDA's attitude, it is that some percentage chance of getting caught at it is quite enough. The possibility of embarrassment is supposed to deter cheating. I do not know just what percentage chance of getting caught ACDA feels is sufficient. It has not made that clear. But I gather it holds to a rather low percentage.

Further whittling away at self-enforcing mechanisms, ACDA negotiated, promoted, and sold the so-called Treaty on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which contains no enforcing mechanisms whatever. ACDA apparently calculated rightly that space is such a nebulous thing that it could get the treaty ratified and there-

by establish precedent for continued erosion of the self-enforcing mechanisms safeguard. The ink was hardly dry on the flypaper this one was written on before the Soviet orbital nuclear bombing system had to be declared legal because presumably they do not put nuclear bombs in it. At least, we cannot prove they do and there are not any inspection mechanisms to find out. That flap was followed quickly by the Soviet fractional orbital ballistic system disclosure. Secretary McNamara's announcement of FOBS embarrassingly had to include a legal brief on behalf of the Soviets as to why FOBS does not violate the Space Treaty.

Despite this recent history, ACDA now comes up with the NPT, article III of which it claims provides an enforcing mechanism in the form of inspection. This is a sad delusion made a tragic one because it is self-induced by ACDA whose spokesmen, Mr. Foster and Mr. Fisher, actually believe article III has real teeth when in truth and in fact it has false teeth for the following reasons:

First, Article III only calls upon signatories to "undertake to accept safeguards as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency" and that such negotiations commence within 180 days after the treaty goes into effect. This is no more than an "agreement to make an agreement." No legal system recognizes as valid or enforceable any such ambiguous present promise to come to a future unspecified agreement. Article III is just as blank as if it remained without words. The words it contains mean nothing. The treaty remains without any provisions for enforcement whatever.

Second, in any event, to speak of IAEA safeguards as something which exist and can be relied upon to enforce this treaty is ridiculous to the point of absurdity. Anyone familiar with the primitive capabilities, either technological and financial, of IAEA in the safeguards area knows this. I personally verified it myself only last September at IAEA headquarters. To assert or imply that IAEA safeguards are something which can be relied upon for the heavy purpose of policing this treaty is misleading and unconscionable. It will take years for IAEA to achieve even a minimum inspection capability. Article III is a trap for the unwary insofar as presence of self-enforcing mechanisms is concerned.

OTHER ACDA SHORTCOMINGS WITH THE NPT

There are other defects in ACDA's handling of the NPT issue which should be considered in evaluating the Agency's plea for further funding. Here are just a couple of samples:

First, Selective-defensive proliferation: Earlier I mentioned that this defense option would be eliminated by the NPT. Since about 1962 we have been able to insert certain devices in our nuclear warheads permitting them to explode only under predetermined conditions. They can be rigged to fire only in a defensive environment, for instance a protective antiballistic missile envelope over and around a country. They can be rigged to explode in the face of anyone attempting to remove this limitation. Supplied to a hard-pressed ally these warheads

would insure self-defense without risk of their being later turned to offensive use. Under a variety of foreseeable contingencies it could become vital to our own national security to engage in selective-defensive proliferation. By providing such defenses we might be relieved from playing the dangerous role of a nuclear Sir Galahad, rushing hither and thither to the rescue of all and sundry who may feel themselves to be victims of an alleged nuclear aggressor. A combination of defense limited nuclear ABM's and nuclear land mines supplied to NATO allies might allow us to withdraw our substantial forces in Europe. The same could be true in other areas.

I am certain that the Soviets see the NPT in an advantageous light because it will not only bar us from using selective-defensive proliferation to reduce our worldwide overcommitments, but, in fact, will extend those overcommitments if we take seriously the Sir Galahad role. It will not similarly disadvantage the Soviets because they are not similarly overcommitted. It also is to be noted that hard-pressed allies who get the notion we might not take the Sir Galahad role seriously when actually called upon to play it might go nuclear on their own and pick up not only a defensive capability, but a troublemaking offensive one as well.

Second, Regional nuclear powers: Considerable emotional fear mongering is being engaged in by ACDA and other NPT proponents concerning the alleged danger of drawing the United States and the U.S.S.R. into nuclear holocaust if one or more additional countries achieve nuclear weapons and start using them. True, in some hands nuclear weapons would be troublesome—but how much more so than otherwise is debatable. Also debatable is whether the NPT would effectively ban the weapons to them anyway. Rand Corp.'s Dr. James R. Schlesinger has pointed out that the achievable nuclear capabilities of such countries are limited and pose little threat of direct attack upon the two superpowers. The consequences will be regional. Recent regional wars between India and Pakistan and Israel and the Arab States fail to support the proposition that the superpowers and other nations inside or outside the region are appreciably more likely to become involved in worldwide holocaust if the fighting is done with primitive nuclear weapons rather than strictly confined to conventional arms. Those who worry about the possible catalytic effect of regional wars should ponder conditions of instability which increase their frequency rather than the weapons with which they may be conducted.

As a matter of fact it is quite possible that a degree of regional nuclear capability would prove stabilizing rather than destabilizing. The presence of nuclear armed Red China amongst nuclear unarmed neighbors is extremely destabilizing. An Indian capability to threaten atomic retaliation from the south might have sobering and stabilizing effects in that region. To the east a nuclear capable Japan could be the focus for a stabilizing Far Eastern alliance against Red

aggression. Filling such regional power vacuums would considerably ease the overseas overcommitments of the United States.

CONCLUSION

I have mentioned but a few of many possible detriments to national security which should be on the balance scales when weighing whether the NPT will serve or disserve the interests of our country. They should have been there before treaty negotiations ever seriously got started. The fact that ACDA does not place them there should be a matter of deep concern. Its advice on Arms Control and Disarmament is what the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the President rely upon. If ACDA does a sloppy job and deludes itself and its advice is faulty, then these officials' actions can be mistaken and the Nation may become imperiled.

That is why I urge no more money for ACDA until it is reformed and can perform in a manner contributing to the national security, not to the contrary.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOSMER. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. Will the gentleman agree with me that the weapon treaty should protect the NATO option and not foreclose the possibility at some future date NATO might develop its own purely defensive nuclear system?

Mr. HOSMER. Not only should NATO have the option to develop its own independent defensive system, whether it be nuclear or conventional, as required, but let me say that if we negotiate this non-proliferation treaty that the Disarmament Agency is trying to foist off on us, it will deny the United States an opportunity to proliferate nuclear weapons to be used defensively. By that I mean that we rig up these weapons in these days so that they can be used only in a defensive environment. This may be very important to the national defense of the United States in a future day to be able to supply NATO or some other ally of ours with defensive nuclear weapons, so they will not go nuclear on their own and acquire an offensive as well as defensive nuclear capability. As a matter of fact, if we deny them that opportunity, then—

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.

Mr. HOSMER. Those people will only have the alternative of backing down to somebody like Red China that does have a nuclear capability or, secondly, to going nuclear on their own. If they go nuclear on their own, they not only acquire a defensive capability but a troublemaking offensive capability as well, and that is not good. You would much rather have the opportunity to proliferate to them selectively as far as defensive nuclear weapons are concerned. There you have a much more manageable situation.

Now, those are things which ACDA has not told you about and which have been totally disregarded in this wild drive for a treaty for a treaty's sake.

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That is why I urge that its funds be cut off until it can be reformed and it can be brought to its senses.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. HOSMER. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. Will the gentleman not agree that this treaty would either expose our friends and allies to a greater threat from the Communist camp or else increase our own police force needs? Would that not follow?

Mr. HOSMER. Oh, yes. If they do not get their own defenses, Uncle Sam has to play world policeman. You know what the job of playing world policeman is and the trouble it has gotten us into so far. It is nothing but trouble. I think that the American people would like to see us stop that kind of foolishness.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD].

(Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I am sorry that I was not on the floor to hear the full remarks of my friend and distinguished colleague from California [Mr. HOSMER] who is the ranking member on the Republican side of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the House of Representatives.

However, I am completely aware of the gentleman's position on the nuclear treaty—Antiproliferation Treaty. I would say that there is a substantial minority among the members of the Joint Committee that subscribes to his position.

However, I have been amazed at some of the statements that have been made here and at some of the statements which have been made by my friend, the distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY], in his "additional remarks" as contained in the report and which are directed against the treaty.

Mr. Speaker, I have never seen so much assumption based upon misinformation brought together in one place.

Mr. Speaker, the discussion of "defensive" and "offensive" weapons of course is ridiculous. Any nuclear weapon that can be used for offensive purposes can be also used for defensive purposes.

Under the present arrangement—and I want the distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY] to hear this—we have more than 6,000 weapons in the NATO alliance, all allotted and assigned within the NATO countries.

Now, Mr. Speaker, it is impossible for the NATO organization at this time to have its own weapons. I wish to ask the gentleman from Illinois, is he for the proliferation of nuclear weapons?

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman from California yield?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Yes, I shall be glad to yield to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker I appreciate the gentleman's yielding because it is my opinion that this is a very important area. And I wish to say this about the question under discussion. I am for protection of the legitimate in-

terests of our friend and allies—latter and past allies—such as West Germany.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Now, Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Illinois is evading the issue. I ask the gentleman from Illinois, is the gentleman for the proliferation of these nuclear weapons?

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, I am for protecting proliferation on behalf of our friends and allies who feel that they have a national interest they must protect.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Now, Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Illinois says he is for proliferation.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, I think he in fairness should add the full quotation—

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Now, let me explain to the Members of the House just what the situation is.

Mr. Speaker, these 6,000 weapons which are located over there are in the hands of the joint forces of NATO and the United States under a series of bilateral agreements, agreements which clearly sets forth the utilization of those weapons. In other words, they are not there for the purpose of proliferation. They are there with the finger on the trigger, the finger of the President of the United States on the trigger. In other words, they cannot use them without the exercise of the finger of the President of the United States. If they do have the independent national right or the group right to use their nuclear weapons without consultation with the United States, then they have the fruits of proliferation.

But, Mr. Speaker, as long as we keep the finger on that trigger I will say to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois that no country, responsible or irresponsible—one who is now responsible but which may become later irresponsible in the future, associated now with the free world but which may become Communistic later, they cannot take those nuclear weapons and use them, because they are controlled by the United States of America.

And, Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY] is for the kind of proliferation about which he has talked, then I say the gentleman is on the wrong track. I say the gentleman is on a dangerous track.

Mr. Speaker, if it comes to a time of war where the Commander in Chief of the United States sees the need about which I am talking to use or to employ nuclear weapons, then he will prescribe their use at that time in order to meet the challenge which exists at that time.

As Commander in Chief, he does have the problem, the privilege and authority, to assign the use of these weapons to meet that particular condition; that is, to meet a condition of war and not a condition which exists in peacetime.

Mr. Speaker, what I am undertaking to say is that we cannot transfer these weapons to any nation or to any group of nations in peacetime for their independent, sovereign control, since this would require a change in the Atomic Energy Act, excluding an emergency

wartime action on the part of the Commander in Chief in time of war.

Mr. Speaker, I am saying that in my opinion the very best manner in which to keep this situation stable, in place of spreading nuclear weapons all over the map, is this approach.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield further to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me again.

I want to proceed with my comments on the assumption that we are engaged in a war in Europe, and I believe—

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The gentleman knows that we are not at war in Europe, and that we are not contemplating the use of nuclear weapons.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 additional minutes to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. FINDLEY. May I proceed further, if the gentleman will continue to yield?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I intended earlier to say we are at war in Vietnam.

I would like to state that our friends in Europe are watching with just as keen—although somewhat different interest—the events in South Vietnam, the beleaguered garrison at Khesanh, and they read the debate that sometimes appears in the press about whether or not, should the situation for these marines really become desperate, whether we would use tactical weapons to defend them.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I am not going to get off on any such a supposition.

Mr. FINDLEY. I believe it is very much to the point, because after all the real, essential defense of NATO is through U.S. nuclear weapons, and Germany is wondering—and will have reason to wonder—if in a crisis we would expose our cities to nuclear attack to protect German or French homes, when in Khe Sanh we might not use such tactical weapons to protect our own forces.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is indulging in fancy. I will decline to yield further.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California declines to yield further.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The gentleman from Illinois can suppose anything that he wants to suppose that the Germans are thinking, but I will tell the gentleman that there is not a nation in NATO that has asked the United States for individual use of atomic weapons, and if they would they would not get them.

And I will tell the gentleman further that as long as I can stand here on the floor of the House and fight against that kind of proliferation of nuclear weapons that I will do so.

So when the gentleman from Illinois is worried about what Germany is won-

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dering about, and taking a position which they have not taken, then I say the gentleman is indulging in fantasy.

Mr. FINDLEY. I believe we ought to be concerned about Germany because the German people are the most exposed of all nations to the Soviet Union, and if Germany, as France has done, should withdraw from NATO, we could well wind up with a European continent of Finlands—

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Illinois is indulging in fantasy.

Mr. FINDLEY. I believe we had better be thinking about this.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We have had no such proposal from the Bonn government. The German Government is not concerned about it. The German Government has more nuclear weapons on its soil than any other nation in the world. This is under a bilateral agreement which is satisfactory to them, and they have never come to us and asked us for independent sovereign control over the nuclear weapons.

Mr. FINDLEY. The gentleman is well aware of the debate in Germany that is going on today over this treaty, and the resentment that is building day by day, not only in Bonn, but —

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I believe I am aware of the recent debate that has occurred. I believe the Germans are afraid that they are not going to obtain some of the peacetime applications of atomic energy. We are not debating with Germany the sole control of nuclear weapons, and if the gentleman does not know that, he should know it.

Mr. FINDLEY. In my opinion the treaty has so little promise of any advantage to our country it is not worth risking irritating our closest allies.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is the opinion of the gentleman, and he is entitled to it. However, let me yield to someone else who is better informed on these points.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOSMER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

First of all I want to say that I agree to a large extent with his remarks as to the situation in Germany. The Germans seem to worry first about the NPT's effects on their growing nuclear, and second as to defense aspects. However, I do want to clear up something which slips into these discussions from time to time which is a tendency by some listeners to equate with being against the Non-proliferation Treaty with being for proliferation. The one does not necessarily mean the other. In my own, and most cases, it certainly does not. I want to make my position clear. It is that I was not for proliferation when the British got the bomb, or when the Soviet Union got the bomb, or when the French got the bomb, or when Red China got the bomb, and I am not now, today, in favor of anybody else getting the bomb, or of any proliferation whatsoever.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I am glad the position of the gentleman is different from the position of the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HOSMER. Now, what I would like to make clear is what I object to. And that is the treaty's denial of the option in the future, if the necessity should arise—

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Now, the gentleman knows—

Mr. HOSMER. Will the gentleman wait, and just let me finish first?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Very well.

Mr. HOSMER. As I say, what I object to is the NPT's blanket denial for all future time of our opinion to proliferate purely defensively if sometime in the future that would become vital to the national security interests of the United States. We live in a changing world. We should not hastily forgo options to take necessary measures, or which might become necessary measures, in the future as things change. At least, we should not do so without carefully evaluating the consequences. This ACDA has failed and neglected to do, and underlies one of my serious objections to the Agency, as I detailed during my remarks when the rule was being considered.

The second objection I have to the NPT is that the treaty is inherently, as now written, defective in provisions for enforcement and monetary cheating and violations, and, therefore, it would not be an adequate vehicle to prevent proliferation. Yet ACDA is selling NPT like a pig-in-a-poke. I object to that.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. We can get into this in general debate, but the gentleman knows this—this phrase "proliferates selectively" is a nice phrase that the gentleman uses. But let me say that proliferation whether it is selectively or in group form is a dangerous situation and every nation in NATO that wants access to nuclear weapons, in joint control—and not in their individual control today—has that privilege and has nuclear weapons on their soil, if they permit it.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALBERT). The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GROSS].

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HOSMER. I just want to say in final response to my distinguished and admired colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD] that selective proliferation might not be good, as he said, but it might be a lot better than nonselective or unselective proliferation with anybody getting the bomb, as might still occur with this treaty because of its defective enforcement clause.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. If the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. LATTA] will yield me another minute, I will be glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LATTA. I will yield the gentleman more time if he needs it.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD].

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The gentleman says that the net effect is that we have not

prevented such proliferation as has occurred, and he is right about that. We cannot prevent proliferation in the future if any nation wants to pull out of this treaty at any time for their own purposes, or if they want to stay out—like France.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Iowa has expired.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GROSS].

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Or if, like France—where France wants to stay out—and probably is staying out of it—of course, they can do this. But this is a treaty to try to suppress proliferation and hold it back as much as we can.

Mr. GROSS. I just want to comment on the remarks that the gentleman from California made a few moments ago when he spoke of Members dealing in fantasy. I cannot think of a more flowery fantasy than the gentleman's statement that we are not at war today, or the implication that we are not at war today.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The gentleman knows that I said we are not at war in Europe. The gentleman heard me say that, if he was listening.

Mr. GROSS. No, the gentleman did not apply it to the war in Europe exclusively.

We are at war. The gentleman says that we would be at war only if the President pushes the button. Since when did it require a declaration of war for this country to engage in armed conflict? And does the gentleman think there would be a time, if someone decided to launch a nuclear campaign against us for Congress to declare war? Fantasy? The gentleman is dealing in fantasy.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY].

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, my purpose is to associate myself with the remarks so eloquently set forth by the gentleman from California [Mr. HOSMER].

It is my purpose by an amendment which I will offer later, to protect the option of this valued alliance, NATO, to some day secure a nuclear defense system if at such time the Members would desire to so act.

It is certainly not to proliferate weapons in any form at the present time. But I think we should be considerate of the self-interest and feelings of our allies and not close permanently the door which might be to their interest at some later date.

Second, I hope the gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD], for whom I have great respect, will find the opportunity during the consideration of this bill by the Committee of the Whole to elaborate on his comment at the outset that my additional views in the committee report are full of false assumptions and errors.

So far in all the time he has taken, he has not cited one single error in those remarks. Therefore, I would hope that in fairness he would delineate what is mistaken and what should be corrected.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

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Mr. LATTI. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, there being no further requests for time, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 14910, REGULATION OF DEVICES CAPABLE OF CAUSING RADIO INTERFERENCE

Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, I call up House Resolution 1084 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 1084

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14910) to amend the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to give the Federal Communications Commission authority to prescribe regulations for the manufacture, import, sale, shipment, or use of devices which cause harmful interference to radio reception. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed one hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. LATTI], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 1084 provides an open rule with 1 hour of general debate for consideration of H.R. 14910 to amend the Communications Act of 1934.

The bill would add a new section 302 to the Communications Act which would empower the FCC to prescribe reasonable regulations governing the interference potential of devices capable of emitting radio energy which could cause harmful interference to radio communications. These regulations would be applicable to the manufacture, importation, sale or offering for sale, shipment, or use of such devices.

Such regulations would not be applicable to carriers transporting such devices without trading in them; devices constructed by electric utilities for their own use; or devices for the use of the Federal Government, or devices intended solely for export.

The legislation also provides that such devices for the use of the Federal Government be designed so as to reduce ra-

dio interference, taking into account the needs of the national defense and security.

Devices capable of causing radio interference are, among others, electronic garage door openers, certain electronic toys, high-powered electronic heaters, diathermy machines, welders, radio and television receivers, ultrasonic cleaners, and remote control devices for such equipment as industrial cranes.

I am happy to say this legislation will not result in any additional cost to the Government.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of House Resolution 1084 in order that H.R. 14910 may be considered.

(Mr. LATTI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LATTI. Mr. Speaker, I agree with the statements just made by the gentleman from New York concerning this bill. The present law is often the fact and and causes the FCC to proceed on a case-to-case basis in locating devices which are causing radio interference. With the passage of this legislation they will be able to regulate the manufacture of such devices and prescribe regulations relative to their manufacturer so that they will not cause interference. This is the sole purpose of the bill, according to the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. STAGGERS] at the time he appeared before the Rules Committee.

However, I raised a question about the language in the bill as it seems to be much broader. He has assured me and the other members of the Rules Committee that the FCC already has these additional powers and no new authority is being granted herein.

I do wish to call to the Members' attention lines 5, 6, and 7, on page 2, which read as follows:

Such regulations shall be applicable to the manufacture, import, sale, offer for sale, shipment or use of such devices.

That language raises in my mind a question as to whether or not the new language, if it is new language, will give them power to go out to every home that has electronically operated garage doors and tell the owners how to operate and use them, or does this give the FCC the authority to tell the owner of one of these little walkie-talkies that he is not operating it properly or that he is on the wrong frequency.

These are questions that I hope will be answered during general debate. They were not answered to my full satisfaction before the Rules Committee, but, with the assurance of the chairman of the full committee that this bill only grants additional powers to the FCC relative to the manufacture of these devices, I voted to report this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time. I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

TO AMEND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT, AS AMENDED

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14940) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization for appropriations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 14940, with Mr. FULTON of Tennessee in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MORGAN] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentlewoman from Ohio [Mrs. BOLTON] will be recognized for 30 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

(Mr. MORGAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14940. H.R. 14940 authorizes \$33 million to finance the operation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for a 3-year period. The bill makes no change in existing law except for the amount of money.

The last previous authorization was enacted in 1965 and authorized \$30 million for the 3 fiscal years 1966, 1967, and 1968.

The work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency involves primarily the backup of the U.S. negotiators who participate in international negotiations on arms control and disarmament.

The Agency was established in 1961 because it was generally recognized that the United States could not very well refuse to participate in such negotiations, and that if we were going to participate, our representatives should have available to them adequate expert assistance and technical information in this highly complex field.

Mr. Chairman, I do not suppose that there is any agency of the U.S. Government Agency is trying to undermine the the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Every once in a while I hear someone say that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is trying to undermine the Defense Department, that the United States is spending money out of one pocket to build up our Armed Forces, and that we are spending money out of another pocket to weaken these forces or to put them out of business.

This idea completely disregards the facts. In the first place, the Department of Defense is fully informed about everything the Arms Control Agency does or

proposes to do. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reports to, and all of its operations are reviewed by, the Committee of Principals which consists of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

In the second place, let me point out that arms control does not diminish U.S. security. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that national security can be improved by balanced, phased, and safeguarded arms control agreements limiting the military capabilities of nations in a manner conducive to the achievement of a secure, free, and peaceful world.

The military posture of the United States would be stronger and our security would be greater if we could get an effective agreement with other nations to limit the size and nature of their forces and weapons.

Secretary McNamara has stated the issue very clearly in the recent discussion of anti-ballistic-missile defenses.

If both the Russians and ourselves maximum our anti-ballistic-missile defense and then maximize our vehicles for penetrating these defenses, neither country will be more secure but both will be poorer.

The main job of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is to enhance the security of the United States. The function of the Agency is to see that the United States goes into any arms control agreement with its eyes open.

Another misconception about the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is that it is an organization that believes that the Russians can be trusted. There are those who argue that it is a complete waste of time to negotiate with the Russians on arms control since any agreement will not be worth the paper it is written on and that the people in charge of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are unrealistic and gullible.

Let me say that my experience has been that the more contact people have with Russian negotiators, the fewer illusions they have. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is fully aware of the pitfalls and the frustrations.

Nevertheless, we have to consider that the Russians on occasion may find that an agreement will serve their interests as well as ours. They have been known to live up to agreements when it is to their advantage to do so.

The United States could refuse to enter into any negotiations relating to arms control and disarmament on the grounds that the Russians cannot be trusted. Nearly all of the governments of the world fear the consequences of atomic war and give top priority to efforts for arms control.

If we are to participate in such negotiations, it is essential that we know what we are doing.

The highest degree of military and scientific knowledge must be readily available to our negotiators. The job of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is to see that the United States has the proper backup for our negotiations.

After 7 days of hearings, which included testimony from distinguished citizens such as John J. McCloy, General Gruenther, and Lewis L. Strauss, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the committee decided to approve the full amount of funds requested and the 3-year authorization as requested.

The bill received strong bipartisan support in the committee. The Foreign Affairs Committee has 36 members—21 Democrats and 15 Republicans. There were only five votes against the bill out of 25 voting.

During the hearings, most of the discussion centered around the nonproliferation treaty, a draft of which has been approved by the United States and by the Soviet Union, and is now pending before the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva.

Several witnesses and some members of the committee are against the nonproliferation treaty, but almost every one favored the continuation of the Agency.

Although the nonproliferation treaty is a matter of concern to the Members of the House and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, this bill does not have anything to do with the approval of the treaty.

The real issue which confronted the committee was whether the operation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should be curtailed or whether it should continue at its present level.

The Agency has had appropriations of \$9 million a year for fiscal 1967 and fiscal 1968. They are asking \$10 million for fiscal 1969. This does not involve an expansion of the Agency's operations.

The Agency has to find the money to finance the employees' pay raise which the Congress enacted last year.

The Agency also has to finance the entire cost of field tests since funds for sharing the cost of such tests was eliminated from the Defense Department appropriations.

This is a small agency with only 268 jobs. Its functions are highly specialized. It does not have the sort of budget which can absorb cuts and continue to perform all of its functions.

Ten million dollars for fiscal year 1969 means that the Agency will be able to continue its present scale of operations. It does not mean an expansion.

The Agency has never had a 1-year authorization. The original authorization in 1961 was adequate for 2 years. In 1963 there was a 2-year authorization, and in 1965 the Congress authorized funds for 3 years.

The committee was impressed by the argument of John J. McCloy, who said:

I think the 3-year authorization is very important. Particularly at this state, if there

was any limitation of the 3-year provision at this point, I think perhaps there would be undue significance attached to it.

Perhaps this is the chief reason I would urge you not to limit the authorization to one year but that you continue with the 3-year period, that it is rather important psychologically at this point. * * *

In short, I think that with the annual review which is incidental to every appropriation bill, together with the fact that at any point this committee can call on anyone to come down to testify and report on its affairs, that it would be unfortunate to give any indication at this point that there is any hesitation about our attachment to the policy of arms control and disarmament which are consistent with the security of the country. (Hearings, pp. 225 and 226.)

Over half of the funds requested are to finance external research. That is research performed under contract by private firms or by universities, or by Government agencies such as the Department of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission, which are reimbursed for research services.

Although there is always a tendency to be suspicious of research expenditures by operating agencies, this Agency has a major research function.

In the first place, the Agency is required to carry on research in a dozen categories which are defined by statute. These are set forth on pages 2 and 3 of the committee report.

The Director of the Agency is directed to do research in these fields. A substantial cut in funds would mean that the Director could not discharge the responsibilities imposed on him.

In addition, although the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission carry on much larger research programs relating to atomic and other weapons, there are a number of problems that are peculiar to the arms control and disarmament business that are not of particular concern to other agencies.

A case in point involves the detection of the existence and the characteristics. Such detection is a major responsibility of the Department of Defense and the intelligence community. Their efforts are directed to a large degree to detecting such weapons by covert means.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency faces the problem of developing techniques for such detection when the country involved has avowedly opened its doors to inspection. While much of the technical information needed for open inspection can be obtained from the Defense Department or the Atomic Energy Commission, there is a different kind of problem which requires special research.

Many pages of the hearings and several pages of the additional views which are printed with the committee report deal with the desirability of making atomic weapons available to NATO.

This discussion really has nothing to do with H.R. 14940, but the Nonproliferation Treaty does require that none of the countries which have atomic weapons—both the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed on this point—shall transfer nuclear explosive devices to any one—including NATO.